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South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v.
Hazeltine:
The Eighth Circuit Abandons Federalism,
Precedent, and Family Farmers
Christy Anderson Brekken*

Introduction
Amendment E to the South Dakota Constitution, passed in
1998, prohibits corporations from owning farmland and otherwise
engaging in farming in South Dakota, with certain exceptions.'
On August 19, 2003, the Eighth Circuit found that Amendment E
violates the dormant Commerce Clause because the amendment
2
discriminates against out-of-state interests.
The Eighth Circuit's ruling represents a dramatic shift in
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, eroding a state's power
to regulate its local economy and the corporations that operate
within its borders. Similar laws in eight other states, which are
several decades old and have survived other constitutional
challenges, are now threatened. Successful challenges to these
laws in largely rural farm-dependent states herald the loss of one
of the last protections for the family farm and rural economies
from corporate concentration and vertical integration in the
3
agricultural sector.
In Part I, this Article describes the pressures on family
farms, the trend toward corporate concentration and increased
farm size, the corresponding impacts on rural communities, and
the history of progressive, pro-family farm laws. 4 Part II discusses
federalism, separation of powers, and dormant Commerce Clause
* J.D. expected 2005, University of Minnesota Law School. My sincerest thanks
go to Farmer's Legal Action Group, Inc. (FLAG) for giving me the opportunity to
work on behalf of family farmers, and for inspiring this Article. I would especially
like to thank David Moeller, a wonderful mentor, writer, and attorney, for his
guidance and support.
1. S.D. CONST. art. XVII, §§ 21-24 (1998).
2. South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583, 596-98 (8th Cir.
2003) (motion for rehearing en banc denied) [hereinafter Hazeltine II].
3. See infra Part I.C.
4. See infra notes 10-71 and accompanying text.
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jurisprudence.5 Finally, Parts 1116 and IV 7 describe and analyze
the Eighth Circuit's decision in South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v.
Hazeltine.
This Article will show that the Eighth Circuit's dormant
Commerce Clause analysis is flawed and should be overturned.8
The court's purview is not to judge the wisdom of these laws.
Rather, under precedent, the court must recognize the state's
inherent power to regulate its local economy, including regulation
of corporations, for the benefit of its citizens.9
I.

The Proliferation and Power of Agribusiness Firms and
the Crisis in Rural America
A.

The Farm Crisishas had a NationalImpact in the Last
Half of the Twentieth Century

Times are tough for family farmers, but that is old news. 10
Farming is an inherently risky business; weather, commodity
prices, costs of inputs and technology, interest rates, government
regulation, land prices, and foreign and domestic competition all
combine to affect a farm's success each growing season, regardless
of its ownership or management structure.11 The number of farms
in the United States has plummeted from more than five million
in 195412 to just over two million in 2001.13 The farm population
has fallen from thirty million in the 1940s to less than five million,
while the average farm size has more than doubled. 14 From 1999
to 2001, the United States lost 34,000 farms, over half of those in

5. See infra notes 72-171 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 172-200 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 202-294 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 295-296 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 203-206 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
11. MARTY STRANGE, FAMILY FARMING: A NEw ECONOMIC VISION 114-15 (1988);
Richard F. Prim, Saving the Family Farm: Is Minnesota's Anti-corporate Farm
Statute the Answer?, 14 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 203, 203 (1993) [hereinafter
Saving the Family Farm]; Jan Stout, The Missouri Anti-corporate Farming Act:
Reconciling the Interests of the Independent Farmer and the Corporate Farm, 64
UMKC L. REV. 835, 838 (1996).
12. John C. Pietila, 'W]e're Doing this Ourselves"- South Dakota's Anticorporate
FarmingAmendment, 27 J. CORP. L. 149, 152 (2001).
13. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., AGRICULTURAL
STATISTICS 2002, IX-2 (2002) (Table 9-2) [hereinafter AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV.].
14. OSHA GRAY DAVIDSON, BROKEN HEARTLAND: THE RISE OF AMERICA'S RURAL
GHETTO 35 (1990).
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the Midwest, which has thirty percent of all farms. 15 South
Dakota saw a seventeen percent decrease in the number of farms

from 1980 to 2001.16
B. Rural Crisis for Farm Families, Communities, and
Environment
1. Farm Families' Livelihoods are Jeopardized by the Rural
Crisis
It is easy to think of declining farm numbers and market
factors affecting faceless farm "operations." However, for small
and medium-sized family farmers, this decline threatens their
families' livelihood. In 1990, farm families were twice as likely as
the general population to live in poverty. 17 Today, farm families
must supplement farm income by working off the farm-more
than half of all farm operators also work off-farm, with eighty
percent of those farmers working full-time off-farm jobs.1s
However, even though fewer farm families now live in poverty, the
statistics do not signal the end of the family farm crisis. The
Commission on Small Farms notes that "for some of these farmers,
off-farm jobs are not a choice, but a necessity due to the inability
to obtain an adequate return from farming. And in some places,
such as Indian -reservations, off-farm jobs are not available at
20
all."19 The farm is simply not supporting family needs anymore.

15. AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., supra note 13, at IX-2 (Table 9-4). The Midwest
states included in the statistics are Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and
Wisconsin. Id.
16. Pietila, supra note 12, at 152 (reporting 39,000 farms in 1980, down to 32,500
farms in 1999); AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., supra note 13, at IX-5 (Table 9-9)
(reporting 32,500 farms in 2001).
17. Stephen Carpenter & Randi Ilyse Roth, Family Farmers in Poverty: A Guide
to AgriculturalLaw for Legal Service Practitioners,29 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1087,
1089 (1996) (citing ECON. RES. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., INCOME, WEALTH, AND
THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF FARM HOUSEHOLDS 1988-1990 10 (1993) (finding

that 22.9% of farm operator households live in poverty whereas 10.7% of all U.S.
families live in poverty)).
18. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ECON. RES. SERV., INCOME, WEALTH, AND THE
ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF FARM HOUSEHOLDS iii (Agric. Econ. Rep. No. 812) (2002)
[hereinafter ECON. RES. SERv.2002].
19. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., NAT'L COMM'N ON SMALL FARMS, A TIME TO ACT: A
REPORT OF THE USDA NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SMALL FARMS 18 (1998)
[hereinafter COMM'N ON SMALL FARMS].
20. ECON. RES. SERV. 2002, supra note 18, at iv. The farm operation actually
reduced pre-tax income for sixty percent of farm households in 1998. See id.
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Rural Farming Communities Sink Deeper into Poverty

In the United States in 1999, 15.7% of people living in
farming-dependent counties were living in poverty, compared to
13.4% of all rural counties in 2000.21 More than half of South
Dakotans live in rural communities, most of which depend on
farming. 22 When local farms are in crisis, the entire local economy
feels the effects. Rural development experts have estimated that
for every five to seven farms that go out of business, one business
in the local town closes. 2 3 Even if the farm that goes out of
business is replaced by a corporate farm, rural businesses are no
better off because of the integration of corporate farming-the
corporate farm is likely to acquire its needs internally or from
outside the local economy. 24 In contrast, "[1]and owners who rely
on local businesses and services for their needs are more likely to
have a stake in the well-being of the community and the wellbeing of its citizens." 25 Additionally, corporate farms do not
provide enough jobs or income to the local economy to replace what
is lost. 26 During the farm crisis of the 1980s, the Midwest's net
27
growth in jobs was in the "lowest paying, poverty level jobs."
The social and economic fabric of a rural community is
intertwined with its farm economy. The "multiplier effect" from
the loss of locally-owned farms pulls down already marginal
communities, which have lower levels of basic services, less
diverse economies, and higher levels of poverty. 28 The farm crisis
21. U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., ECON. RES. SERVICE, RURAL INCOME, POVERTY, AND
WELFARE:
RURAL
POVERTY,
at

http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/IncomePovertyWelfare/ruralpoverty/ (last visited
Feb. 13, 2004).
22. Pietila, supra note 12, at 150-51.
23. DAVIDSON, supra note 14, at 57.
24. Richard F. Prim, Minnesota's Anti-corporate Farm Statute Revisited:
Competing Visions in Agriculture, and the Legislature'sRecent Attempt to Empower
Minnesota Livestock Farmers, 18 HAMLINE L. REV. 431, 447 (1995) [hereinafter
Minnesota'sAnti-corporate Farm Statute] ("[TIhe purchasing trend associated with
the large operations indicates that this production structure is not as socially
beneficial as smaller farms because the larger operations are less likely to support
their local communities through main street purchases." (citation omitted)).
25. COMM'N ON SMALL FARMS, supranote 19, at 21.
26. DAVIDSON, supra note 14, at 36 ("Farm management companies, which often
hire bankrupt farmers to work the land they once owned, for hourly wages,
increased their control over agricultural land by 36 percent between 1980 and
1986." (citation omitted)).
27. See id. at 59.
28. See Carpenter & Roth, supra note 17, at 1092; Steve H. Murdock et al.,
Impacts of the Farm Financial Crisis of the 1980s on Resources and Poverty in
Agriculturally Dependent Counties in the United States, in RURAL POVERTY:
SPECIAL CAUSES AND POLICY REFORMS 68-72 (Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr. & Gregory
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America, including
of the 1980s sparked a rural crisis throughout
29
homelessness.
and
malnutrition,
hunger,
Society should not be troubled by the fall of the family farm
merely as the end of a romantic era of the noble and independent
farmer. The loss of family farms has a ripple effect beyond the
farm to the local rural economy. With farms and local businesses
closing, rural populations are pushed to urban areas where the
they join the urban poor in a desperate bid for
crisis continues as
30
scarce resources.
3. Corporate Farming Methods Take a Toll on the
Environment
Insofar as a farmer's treatment of the land and water
depends on government regulation and the use of new technology,
a
there is little evidence that a family owned farm is different from 31
corporate-owned farm in terms of environmental impact.
However, family-owned farms tend to be smaller, making it easier
to responsibly manage natural resources. 32 A traditional family
farm was a diverse operation that allowed for sustainable
management of resources.33 The rise of corporate farm operations
has led to more industrialization in farming-where one type of
operation is done on a mass scale. 34 Industrialization requires
greater use of petroleum fuels, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides
In livestock production, greater
in grain production. 35
concentrations of animals are confined in smaller areas resulting
in serious odor problems and ground and surface water

Weither eds., 1989).
29. DAVIDSON, supra note 14, at 75-76.
30. See Saving the Family Farm, supra note 11, at 207 ("Another factor not
considered . . .is the social cost caused by the mass exodus of rural people to the
city in search of work. The relationship between rural shrinkage and urban decline
is not adequately considered by most in favor of corporate farming."). See also A.V.
KREBS, THE CORPORATE REAPERS: THE BOOK OF AGRIBUSINESS 63 (1991)
("Virtually every aspect of the urban crisis-poverty and welfare, employment,
crime, housing and health-could be linked to a migration from rural America ......
(citing a statement of former Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman)).
31. Keith D. Haroldson, Two Issues in Corporate Agriculture: Anticorporate
FarmingStatutes and ProductionContracts, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 393, 398 (1992).
32. See COMM'N ON SMALL FARMS, supra note 19, at 21.
33. Saving the Family Farm, supra note 11, at 206-07 ("The family farm of the
past was perfectly environmentally efficient. Farmers raised grain and livestock.
The farm was its own closed ecological cycle." (citation omitted)). Stout, supra note
11, at 838 ('The traditional family farm has been the most socially and
environmentally sound method of agricultural production ....
34. See Saving the Family Farm, supranote 11, at 207.
35. Id.
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contamination from large manure lagoons.3 6
C. The Rise of the CorporateFarm, the Fall of the
Competitive Local Market
Even though all farmers face the same pressures, all farms
are not equally equipped to weather bad times. As of 1998, about
ninety-four percent of U.S. farms were small farms, but they
received only about forty-one percent of all farm income. 37 Large
corporate agribusiness operations have a competitive edge over
smaller farms in a variety of ways-access to capital, limited
continuity,
centralized
liability,
tax
benefits,
business
management, and easy ownership transfer.38 These advantages
enhance their ability to squeeze small farms out of the market. 39
Access to capital and flexible financing are the most important
advantages large agribusiness corporations have over family
farmers. 4o Not only does the corporate structure allow firms to
pool capital from a variety of sources, agribusiness firms may also
shift funds from other operations to support farm operations and
41
leverage that capital to obtain favorable credit financing.
Furthermore, corporate concentration in agriculture has lead to
vertical integration of farming operations-one firm controls farm
42
inputs, production, processing, packaging, and marketing.
"Concentration translates into the loss of open and competitive
markets at the local level .... The basic tenets of a 'competitive'
market are less and less evident in crop and livestock markets
today." 43 Family farmers are no longer on the same footing as
corporate agribusiness, as the "competitive" market is captured by
44
the biggest players.
36. Minnesota's Anti-corporate Farm Statute, supra note 24, at 447; Stout, supra
note 11, at 842-43 (describing confinement method of industrial hog facilities) and
848-50 (describing the environmental consequences of industrial hog facilities,
which "flushes animal waste ... into football field size lagoons," where leaks and
spills kill fish and enter the local water supply).
37. COMM'N ON SMALL FARMS, supra note 19, at 18 (defining small farms as those
with gross sales under $250,000).
38. Minnesota's Anti-corporate Farm Statute, supra note 24, at 433; Haroldson,
supra note 31, at 400.
39. Minnesota's Anti-corporate Farm Statute, supra note 24, at 433; Haroldson,
supra note 31, at 400.
40. Minnesota's Anti-corporate Farm Statute, supra note 24, at 433; Haroldson,
supra note 31, at 400.
41. See Haroldson, supra note 31, at 401.
42. COMM'N ON SMALL FARMS, supra note 19, at 9; Saving the Family Farm,
supra note 11, at 206.
43. COMM'N ON SMALL FARMS, supra note 19, at 22,
44. Id. at 8-9 ("[F]rom 1910 to 1990, the share of the agricultural economy
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1. Farm Size Matters to Rural Communities and
Economies

The prevailing economic wisdom is that "bigger is better" in
farming because it is more economically efficient. 45 Because larger
operations input fewer resources per unit of product, the corporate
farm is either considered to be in the national interest or simply
inevitable because the market demands efficiency. 46 However,
policy based on strict economic efficiency does not take all relevant
"Soil resource loss, environmental
costs into consideration.
degradation, food security and sustainability and other such costs
not specifically built into the market pricing system are generally
ignored."47 Economic studies also show that "small family and
part-time farms are at least as efficient as larger commercial
operations. In fact, there is evidence of diseconomies of scale as
farm size increases." 48 Economic efficiency is only one factor
among many considered when society makes policy choices about
the structure of our agricultural system. 49 If locally-owned small
and medium-sized farms are as economically efficient as large
corporate-owned farms and also serve additional social goods,
states have an incentive to encourage the smaller family farm
ownership structure for the health of local economies and the
50
environment.
received by farmers dropped from 21 to 5 percent." (citation omitted)); Saving the
Family Farm, supra note 11, at 206; DAVIDSON, supra note 14, at 30 ("As farmers
were going bankrupt in the early 1980s, ConAgra reported record sales and
earnings each year." (citation omitted)).
45. COMM'N ON SMALL FARMS, supra note 19, at 14; STRANGE, supra note 11, at
78.
46. COMM'N ON SMALL FARMS, supra note 19, at 14; STRANGE, supra note 11, at
78. See Neil D. Hamilton, Agriculture Without Farmers? Is Industrialization
Restructuring American Food Production and Threatening the Future of
SustainableAgriculture?, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 613, 615 (1994).
47. KREBS, supra note 30, at 16.
48. COMM'N ON SMALL FARMS, supra note 19, at 20 (quoting Willis L. Peterson,
Are Large Farms More Efficient? Staff Paper P97-2 (Jan. 1997) (Department of
Applied Economics, University of Minnesota).
49. See generally Haroldson, supra note 31, at 397-99. Such policy choices are
appropriate for society to make consciously. First, agriculture is already one of the
most heavily regulated industries in the country, so the market is guided by policy
choices already made. Second, farms are more than just a business that can come
and go without notice. Their fate affects the livelihoods of a great number of real
See supra notes 22-30 and
people who have an interest in farm policy.
accompanying text. Third, while only three percent of the population lives or works
on farms, a vast number of people beyond the countryside feel a deeper cultural
connection to the idea of the family farm and connection to the land and food,
evident from continuing political and social attention given to saving the family
farm and the origin of our food. See Haroldson, supra note 31, at 399.
50. See supranotes 17-36 and accompanying text.
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2. Local Ownership and Control Matters to the Local
Economy
The social ills associated with agricultural concentration are
not limited to the size and number of farms. Land ownership and
control of farms also significantly impact the analysis of the
The United States Department of
burdens on society. 51
Agriculture's (USDA) National Commission on Small Farms
associates absentee ownership with deterioration of rural
communities, and cites diversity of ownership as one of the public
values of small farms: "[d]ecentralized land ownership produces
more equitable economic opportunity for people in rural
communities, as well as greater social capital."5 2 Local landowners
have a stake in the well-being of their community, and in turn are
more likely to be held accountable for the negative effects of their
operations.5 3 Family operations also have a present and long-term
connection to their land, and thus both emotional and business
54
incentives to manage their natural resources responsibly.
As absentee owners, corporate farmers have no connection to
the land or community.5 5 Maximization of short-term profit for
shareholders is the primary motivation for corporate actions.
Corporations also enjoy limited liability to protect decision-makers
The very
from liability for environmental contamination. 56
structure of corporate-owned farms leads them to be poor
57
neighbors to rural communities, and poor stewards of the land.
The USDA's own National Commission on Small Farms
acknowledges that federal farm policy over the last twenty years
has favored a
structural bias toward greater concentration of assets and
wealth in fewer and larger farms and fewer and larger
agribusiness firms. Federal farm programs have historically
51. Hamilton, supra note 46, at 614 (noting that the "principal organizational
characteristic of [large, industrialized farms] is the separation of ownership from
operation").
52. COMM'N ON SMALL FARMS, supra note 19, at 20-21.
53. Id. at 21.

54. Minnesota'sAnti-corporateFarm Statute, supra note 24, at 441.
55. Id. at 442.
56. Id.
57. Hamilton, supra note 46, at 637 (discussing generally the importance of the
structure-specifically ownership and control---of agricultural production for our
economy and food system, and specifically noting an "abuse and exploitation of
natural resources, primarily by non-residents, and increasingly international
corporate economic interests").

2004]

HAZEL TINE

Tax policies give large
benefited large farms the most.
farmers greater incentives for capital purchases to expand
Large farms that depend on hired
their operations.
laws
farmworkers receive exemptions from Federal labor
58
allowing them the advantage of low-wage labor costs.
In contrast, the USDA's National Commission on Small
Farms has a different vision for American agriculture:
It is our resolve that small farms will be stronger and will
thrive, using farming systems that emphasize the
management, skill, and ingenuity of the individual farmer...
. [N]ot only will they continue their valuable contribution to
the Nation's food supply, but they will also fuel local
economies and energize rural communities all across America.
. . . This vision is focused on those farms with less than
$250,000 gross receipts annually, on which day-to-day labor
and management are provided by the farmer and/or the farm
family that owns the production or owns, or leases, the
productive assets. 59
Similarly, state legislatures and citizens have made the
connection between increased corporate concentration in farming
and social and economic degradation in rural communities. Nine
states have adopted legislation or constitutional amendments
limiting corporate ownership of farmland or corporate farming
activities. 60 The laws typically exempt "family farm corporations,"
"authorized farm corporations," and some kinds of farming
activities. 61 These states recognize that it is the secondary effects
of the corporate structure that are problematic-larger operations,
absentee ownership, monopolistic effects on local markets, and the
62
associated social and environmental degradation.

58. COMM'N ON SMALL FARMS, supra note 19, at 8.
59. Id. at 9-10. The Commission's vision parallels Amendment E's policy choices
regarding the operation of small farms, envisioning local ownership and control.
Id.
60. See IOWA CODE §§ 9H.1-9H.15 (2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.5902-17.5904
(1995); MINN. STAT. § 500.24 (2002); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 350.015 (2001); NEB. CONST.
art. 12, § 8; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-06.1-01 to 10-06.1-27 (2001); OKLA. CONST. art.
XXII, § 2; S.D. CODIFIED LAwS §§ 47-9A-1 to 47-9A-23 (2003); S.D. CONST. art.
XVII, §§ 21-24; WIS. STAT. § 182.001 (2002).
61. Pietila, supra note 12, at 152 n.20. See Haroldson, supra note 31, at 403-05.
The exception for "family farm" or "authorized farm" corporations requires a
relationship between shareholders or a small number of shareholders, and that at
least one shareholder reside on the farm or engage in the day-to-day operation of
the farm. Id. at 403.

62. See supra notes 42-43, 55-57 and accompanying text.
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D. South Dakota'sAnti-corporateFarmingLaw Attempts to
PreserveLocal Rural Economies
South Dakota first attempted to regulate the economic
burden created by corporate farming with the Family Farm Act of
1974 (FFA).63 Farm advocates and legislators became convinced
that the increasing presence of "agricultural conglomerates would
have an adverse impact on South Dakota's traditional family
farms and rural communities" through their influence over
64
agricultural markets.
In response, the South Dakota Legislature hoped to
strengthen the position of the family farm to preserve rural
economies. In 1988, after large corporations sought to expand hog
production operations in the state, nearly sixty percent of South
Dakota voters approved a measure that expanded the FFA
restrictions to corporate "hog confinement facilities. '65 In 1995,
contrary to the intent of the Act, the Attorney General narrowly
construed the language of the Amendment to open the door for
major feeding operations in the state as long as the hogs were bred
66
and farrowed at separate facilities.
Two years later, a coalition of farm advocates and citizens'
groups, including the 14,000-member South Dakota Farmers
Union and Dakota Rural Action, initiated a proposed amendment
to the state constitution to again attempt to limit corporate
involvement in farming, including "hog factories." 67 Proponents
claimed the measure was necessary to "prevent corporate
manipulation of livestock markets, protect the environment, and
safeguard the social and economic well-being of rural
communities." 6s Opponents, including the 10,000-member South
Dakota Farm Bureau, argued that the amendment would
"discriminate against successful family farmers . . . and fail to
protect the environment or prevent large-scale hog operations." 69
After lively political debate, nearly sixty percent of voters,
including two-thirds of the state's farmers, adopted Amendment E
in 1998.70 Patterned after Nebraska's anti-corporate farming law,

63. Pietila, supra note 12, at 153.
64. Id. at 153.
65. Id. at 155.
66. Id. at 155-56. Farrowing is caring for sows and their piglets during and after
gestation. Id. at 155 n. 44.
67. Id. at 156.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 157.
70. Id.
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South Dakota's Amendment E is one of the strictest anti-corporate
71
farming laws in the country.

II. Hurdles for Constitutional Challenges to Anti-corporate
Farming Laws
A.

Past ConstitutionalChallenges to Anti-corporate
FarmingLaws have Failed

Numerous farm regulatory laws have survived constitutional
challenges.
Anti-corporate farming laws in North Dakota,
Missouri, and Nebraska have been upheld against constitutional
challenges under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Contract
Clause, and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
14th Amendment. 72 No previous case challenged such a law under
the dormant Commerce Clause, and commentators have doubted
73
the success of such a challenge.
In Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, the opponents
unsuccessfully challenged a farm regulatory law on several
grounds. 74
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Constitution7 5 cannot be invoked on behalf of a corporation
76
because it is not a "citizen" within the meaning of the Clause.
The only Contract Clause 77 challenge to an anti-corporate farming
law failed because no contract rights were implied from the

71. Id. at 158. S.D. CONST. art. XVII, §§ 21-24 prohibits corporate ownership of
land and corporate farming activities such as contract operations, including most
It exempts "family farm"
partnership and other limited-liability vehicles.
corporations or cooperatives where the majority of the stock is held by related
persons and at least one of those persons resides on the property or engages in the
day-to-day operation of the farm. Id. at § 22(1), (2). Corporations seeking the
exemption must file with the Secretary of State. Id. at § 24. It also exempts
certain farming activities, such as agricultural research, growing seed, nursery
plants or sod, owning mineral rights in agricultural land, and custom spraying,
fertilizing or harvesting. Id. at § 22.
72. Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207 (1945) (upholding North Dakota
law against Privileges and Immunities Clause, Contract Clause, due process, and
equal protection challenges); MSM Farms, Inc. v. Spire, 927 F.2d 330 (8th Cir.
1991) (upholding Nebraska constitutional amendment against equal protection and
due process challenges); State ex rel. Webster v. Lehndorff Geneva, Inc., 744 S.W.2d
801 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (upholding Missouri statute against equal protection and
due process challenges).
73. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
74. 326 U.S. 207 (1945).
75. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
76. Asbury Hosp., 326 U.S. at 210-11.
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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corporation's holding of farmland.78 After reviewing the law for
rational relation to proper legislative purpose, the Supreme Court
recognized the "unqualified power of the state to preclude [a
corporation's] entry into the state" to engage in farming. 79
An equal protection challenge to the anti-corporate farming
laws was equally unsuccessful because those laws did not affect a
suspect class such as one based on race or gender.8 0 Since the
challengers of the laws could not offer proof of irrationality, the
Supreme Court deferred to the legislature's judgment that the
discrimination against corporations was rational81
Following
precedent, the Eighth Circuit in 1991 unequivocally held that a
policy "to retain and promote family farm operations in Nebraska"
was a "legitimate state interest under the equal protection
clause."8 2 The circuit court discussed the increase in corporate
concentration in farming and the decrease in family farms,
concluding that:
It is up to the people of the State of Nebraska, not the courts,
to weigh the evidence and decide on the wisdom and utility of
measures adopted through the initiative and referendum
process. Whether in fact the law will meet its objectives is not
the question: the equal protection clause is satisfied if the
people of Nebraska could rationally have decided that
prohibiting non-family farm corporations might8 3protect an
agriculture where families own and work the land.
Prior to Hazeltine, commentators had concluded that a
dormant Commerce Clause challenge to anti-corporate farming
laws was unlikely to be successful because the laws do not
differentiate between in-state and out-of-state corporations, and
there is a legitimate state interest in regulating corporate
84
operations in local agricultural markets.

78. Id.
79. Asbury Hosp., 326 U.S. at 211. The court also upheld the power of the state
to exclude corporations already doing business in the state. Id. at 211-12.
80. See Martin J. Troshynski, Corporate Ownership Restrictions and the United
States Constitution,24 IND. L. REV. 1657, 1660-61 (1991).
81. Asbury Hosp., 326 U.S. at 214-15.
82. MSM Farms, Inc., 927 F.2d, at 333. See also Pietila, supra note 12, at 162
(noting that the Nebraska and South Dakota constitutional amendments
restricting corporate farming have the same basic provisions-both restrict
corporate farming and corporate ownership of farmland while exempting family
farm corporations owned by family members where at least one member is active in
the day-to-day labor and management of the farm).
83. Id. (citation omitted).
84. See Pietila, supra note 12, at 164-68. See Troshynski, supra note 80, at 166467.
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B. Federalism and Separation of Powers Concerns Militate
Against Invalidationof State Laws when Traditional
State Powers are Implicated

Dormant Commerce Clause analysis has traditionally
balanced Congress' power to ensure open national markets under
the Commerce Clause with federalism principles.8 5 Federalism
originates in the explicit enumeration of Congress' powers in the
Constitution balanced against the states' retention of the
remaining powers under the Tenth Amendment.8 6 Congress'
power to regulate economic activity is not exclusive: "[i]n
conferring upon Congress the regulation of commerce, it was never
intended to cut the States off from legislating on all subjects
relating to the health, life, and safety of their citizens, though the
87
legislation might indirectly affect the commerce of the country."
Despite the Tenth Amendment, commentators and jurists
alike have warned that the dormant Commerce Clause has the
potential to erode state sovereignty, as it "has proved to be one of
the most prolific sources of invalidation of state laws. 8 8 Moreover,
allowing states the freedom to create new laws without the
looming threat of the dormant Commerce Clause has policy
advantages: "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
89
risk to the rest of the country."

85. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443
(1960); Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 103 (1876). See also Julian Cyril Zebot,
Awakening a Sleeping Dog: An Examination of the Confusion in Ascertaining
Purposeful DiscriminationAgainst Interstate Commerce, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1063,
1085-86 (2002) (criticizing the dormant Commerce Clause as a whole on federalism
principles: "[s]uch concerns have only been magnified by the courts' expansion of
the doctrine [of federalism] over the last several decades"). As dormant Commerce
Clause analysis mirrors Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it is worth mentioning
that federalism has recently become an important concern of the Court, narrowing
Congress' power to legislate. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
See also John J. Dinan, The Rehnquist Court's FederalismDecisions in Perspective,
15 J.L. & POL. 127, 145-46 (1999) (discussing the Lopez decision and the dormant
Commerce Clause).
86. U.S. CONST. amend. X; Michael A. Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent
Dormant Commerce Clause: A Proposed Unitary Framework, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POLY 395, 401-02 (1998).
87. Sherlock, 93 U.S. at 103.
88. Dinan, supra note 85, at 181. See Zebot, supra note 85, at 1085-86 (noting
that Justices Scalia and Thomas in particular believe that the dormant Commerce
Clause should be significantly limited or simply eliminated, while it "threatens to
inflame federalism sensibilities" of more moderate justices).
89. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.
dissenting). See generally Lawrence, supra note 86, at 405.
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Because of the its nontextual origins, the dormant Commerce
Clause has also been criticized as a violation of the separation of
powers doctrine. 90 Congress, not the courts, must ensure that
local markets remain open to interstate commerce. 91 Additionally,
when federal courts invalidate laws under the dormant Commerce
Clause, they also judge the power and wisdom of state legislatures.
"[C]ourts are not any the more entitled, because interstate
commerce is affected, to substitute their own for the legislative
judgment." 92 In a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, a court
should first recognize if the law is within the traditional power of
the state and give full weight to that recognition when evaluating
the impact of the law on interstate commerce. 93 Indeed, the Tenth
Amendment "makes state actions valid as a matter of law-in
effect, it gives state actions a presumption of validity-unless
'94
expressly or impliedly prohibited by the Constitution.
C. Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudencedoes not
PrecludeAll State Regulation of Local Markets
The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate
commerce among the states. 95 The Framers wanted to create a
common national market by eliminating internal trade barriers
among the states. 96 Note that this is a "political theory of union,
not []an economic theory of free trade; '97 the Commerce Clause
does not mandate the courts to keep all markets free from all
regulation. 98 From this express grant of power to Congress, the
Supreme Court implied a limitation on state power to pass laws
that unduly burden interstate commerce-hence the "dormant"
Commerce Clause. 99 The non-textual aspect of the doctrine makes
it immediately suspect even to those who support the doctrine in

90. See Lawrence, supra note 86, at 403-04.
91. Id. at 404.
92. Board of R.R. Com'rs v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 172 P.2d 452, 459
(Mont. 1946).
93. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142-43 (1970) ("If a legitimate
local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree .... [W]e have
recognized the legitimate interest of a State in maximizing the financial return to
an industry within it .... Therefore ... we may assume the constitutional validity
of the Act.").
94. Lawrence, supra note 86, at 402. See supra note 93.
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
96. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 403

(2d ed. 2002).
97. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 417 (2d ed. 1988).
98. Id.
99. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 96, at 401.
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theory and raises the federalism and separation of powers
principles ever present in judicial review.100 The agricultural
industry, as a national market, is within Congress' power to
regulate under the Commerce Clause; therefore, state laws that
have an undue burden on the production of agricultural products
may be invalidated under the dormant Commerce Clause.101
1.

Pike's Two-step Dormant Commerce Clause Test
Determines the Fate of State Economic Regulations

Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is widely criticized
10 3
"hopelessly confused,"'10 4
as a "quagmire,"110 2 "not predictable,"
105
One commentator has gone
and "not always ... easy to follow."
so far as to say that a decision "often appears to turn more on ad
hoc reactions to particular cases than on any consistent
application of coherent principles." 10 6 Nevertheless, courts follow a
two-step dormant Commerce Clause analysis derived from Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc.:10 7 (1) determine whether the law discriminates
against out-of-state parties on its face, in its effect, or in its
purpose; (2) balance the burden on interstate commerce against
the state purpose in enacting the law. 10 8 If the law is found to be
discriminatory in step one, the court will invoke a strict scrutiny
test in step two, and the law is presumptively invalid. 0 9 If the law
is not discriminatory under step one, the court will invoke a
rational basis test in step two and the law is presumptively

100. Zebot, supra note 85, at 1085; Lawrence, supra note 86, at 403.
101. Troshynski, supra note 80, at 1665 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942)); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949) ("Our system,
fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer .. .shall be encouraged to
produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the
Nation.").
102. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458

(1959).
103. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 898 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
104. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 706 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.
dissenting).
105. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987); Zebot, supra
note 85, at 1063; Lawrence, supranote 86, at 397.
106. TRIBE, supranote 98, at 439.
107. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
108. Id. at 142 ("Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 96,
at 410.
109. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 96, at 410.
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valid. 110 Thus, the fate of the state law depends largely on
whether the court determines under step one of the Pike test that
the law discriminates against out-of-state interests.11
a.

Pike Step One: The Court Must Find Discrimination
Against Interstate Commerce

Both the Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit have made it
clear that "[flor purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause,
'discrimination' means 'differential treatment of in-state and outof-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens
the latter." 12 A statute that expressly draws a distinction
between in-state and out-of-state parties will be deemed
discriminatory on its face.11 3 A more difficult question is a facially
neutral law that may have a discriminatory effect or purpose.
"[T]he Court never has articulated clear criteria for deciding when
proof of a discriminatory purpose and/or effect is sufficient for a
state or local law to be deemed discriminatory."' 1 4
Courts
5
approach the question on a case-by-case basis."
The Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit have stated that a
discriminatory purpose can trigger strict scrutiny, 16 but in no case
has discriminatory purpose alone been sufficient. 117 Even a
finding of discriminatory
purpose in conjunction
with
discriminatory effect has been "relatively rare."" 8 Commentators,
agreeing with the underlying principals but dissatisfied with the
Court's ad hoc approach, have suggested various theories to
analyze these cases. 119

110. Id.
111. Id. at 412.
112. Hampton Feedlot, Inc. v. Nixon, 249 F.3d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).
113. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 96, at 412-13.
114. Id. at 414-15.
115. Id. at 417; see supranote 106 and accompanying text.
116. Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984); Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981); SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota, 47 F.3d
263, 268 (8th Cir. 1995).
117. See, e.g., Bacchus Imps., Ltd., 468 U.S. at 273 ("[lI]t had both the purpose
and effect of discriminating in favor of local products."); SDDS, Inc., 47 F.3d at 272
("Although facially neutral, the referendum had a discriminatory purpose and a
sufficiently discriminatory effect to trigger strict scrutiny.").
118. Lawrence, supra note 86, at 419.
119. See id. at 416-17 (suggesting a simplified test of (1) whether the state law
pursues a legitimate state purpose, and if so, (2) whether the legitimate purpose is
so outweighed by the burdens imposed on interstate commerce that it must be
struck down); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:
Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1094-95
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At this point, federalism concerns arise both as a practical
matter by the courts, and as a matter of principle according to
commentators. 120 The Eighth Circuit has recognized federalism
concerns by addressing the reality that almost any local economic
121
To balance
regulation has some effect on interstate commerce.
those concerns, courts have refused to find discriminatory purpose
as long as a statute applies equally to in-state and out-of-state
parties, absent a showing of a substantial impact on interstate
commerce.1 22 Where the court has found discriminatory purpose,
the cases are fact specific and evidence of discriminatory effect is
highly relevant to the conclusion of the court.123
Because the mass of dormant Commerce Clause cases are so
fact specific and the Court has failed to provide a coherent test to
follow, commentators find it useful to24 break the cases into
categories based on the state regulation.
State regulations seemingly aimed at furthering public health
(1986) (suggesting that the underlying goal of the dormant Commerce Clause is to
stop economic protectionism, and a statute is protectionist only if (1) the purpose is
to improve the competitive position of in-state parties just because they are local at
the expense of out-of-state parties, and (2) the statute uses traditional instruments
of protectionism-the tariff, quota, or embargo); Zebot, supra note 85, at 1085
(suggesting that a discriminatory motive must be found to be the "but for" cause for
the state action; the plaintiff bears the burden of showing discriminatory purpose
was a "substantial part or fact" of the action, then the burden shifts to the
defendant to prove that it would have reached the same decision regardless of the
discriminatory purpose).
120. Lawrence, supra note 86, at 401-03. 'The lack of predictability hinders
States' efforts to regulate matters within their own borders, thus potentially
disturbing in a basic sense their sovereignty." Id. at 398. See supranote 85.
121. United Waste Sys. of Iowa, Inc. v. Wilson, 189 F.3d 762, 767 (8th Cir. 1999)
("If taken to an extreme, every state regulation would have some minimal effect on
interstate commerce."); Ben Oehrleins & Sons & Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin
County, 115 F.3d 1372, 1387 (8th Cir. 1997) ('Like any other local market
regulation, Ordinance 12 may or may not encourage companies from doing business
in the state. But while this may be a relevant concern in forming economic policies,
it is simply not the proper inquiry for considering discrimination under the
Commerce Clause."). Discriminatory purpose has been described as the state
engaging in "simple economic protectionism." Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S.
C
at 471 (quoting Philadelphia. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
122. E.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 125-28 (1978); Clover
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 471-72 ("Minnesota's statute does not effect 'simple
protectionism,' but 'regulates evenhandedly' by prohibiting all milk retailers from
selling their products in plastic, nonreturnable milk containers, without regard to
whether the milk, the containers, or the sellers are from outside the State.");
Hampton Feedlot, Inc. v. Nixon, 249 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2001). See infra notes 126146 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984) (finding
discriminatory effect); SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota, 47 F.3d 263, 271 (8th Cir. 1995)
(finding discriminatory effect).
124. Regan, supra note 119, at 1098-1100 (defining "movement-of-goods" cases,
including Exxon Corp.).
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or safety, or at restraining fraudulent or otherwise unfair
trade practices, are less likely to be perceived as "undue
burdens on interstate commerce" than are state regulations
evidently seeking to maximize the profits of local businesses..
. . [Olne would have to say that regulations seemingly focused
on preserving local employment as such rather than
maintaining local profits have sometimes received treatment
almost as favorable as regulations concerned
with health or
25
other non-financial aspects of well-being. 1
In the end, however, a dormant Commerce Clause analysis
will come down to the specific facts of the case. The best analysis
compares the present facts to the most analogous authoritative
cases.
i.

Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland

The case most analogous to Hazeltine is Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Maryland.126 Maryland law prohibited a producer or
refiner of petroleum from operating a retail service station in the
state, clearly intending to eliminate vertical integration of the
petroleum industry within the state while favoring local
businesses. 127
Because there were virtually no petroleum
producers or refiners in the state, the burden of the law fell almost
exclusively on out-of-state companies while the benefits fell almost
128
entirely on local independent businesses.
Even with this strong indication of discriminatory purpose
and effect, the Court found that the law did not discriminate
against interstate commerce.1 29 The law treated in-state and outof-state petroleum producers and refiners in the same way:
neither may own a retail station. The Court found that out-ofstate independent dealers face no barriers to entering the

125. TRIBE, supra note 98, at 437.

126. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
127. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 96, at 416 ("[Tlhere was strong evidence of a
discriminatory purpose. . . . [Tjhe Court found that a state law was not
discriminatory even though it greatly harmed out-of-state oil companies and
favored local businesses."); TRIBE, supra note 98, at 416 ("[The Court upheld a
statute that required vertically-integrated oil companies, whether in-state or outof-state, to divest themselves of their retail operations.").
128. Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 125-27. The Court noted:
Of the class of stations statutorily insulated from the competition of the
out-of-state integrated firms . . . more than 99 percent were operated by
local business interests. Of the class of enterprises excluded entirely from
participation in the retail gasoline market, 95 percent were out-of-state
firms, operating 98 percent of the stations in the class.
Id. at 138 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
129. Id. at 125-29.
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Maryland market, either by prohibition or by added costs.130
While the refiners will no longer enjoy their same status in the
Maryland market, in-state independent dealers will have no
competitive advantage over out-of-state dealers. The fact that
the burden of a state regulation falls on some interstate
companies does not, by itself, establish a claim of
discrimination against interstate commerce.'
The oil companies also argued that the Maryland law
impermissibly burdened the interstate petroleum market by
changing the flow of goods in interstate commerce. The Court
rejected this argument, noting that while the refiners would pull
out of the Maryland market, other companies would adequately
replace them. 132 The Court refused to accept the assertion that
"the Commerce Clause protects the particular structure or
methods of operation in a retail market." 133 Further, "the Clause
protects the interstate market, not particular interstate firms,
from prohibitive or burdensome regulations." 134 Because the
market would continue to operate properly, the Court found no
1 35
burden on the movement of goods within interstate commerce.
The particular structure of the market is a question of the wisdom
of the statute so long as it does not burden the movement of goods
1 36
in interstate commerce.
Finally, the Court found that the state retains the power to
regulate the local operation of the petroleum market, even though
137
the economic market for petroleum operates on a national scale.
The state regulation will only be pre-empted if there is a need for
138
national uniformity to ensure the flow of interstate goods.
ii.

Hampton Feedlot, Inc. v. Nixon

The Eighth Circuit followed the same principles in Hampton
130. Id. at 125-26.
131. Id. at 126.
132. Id. at 127.

133. Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 127.
134. Id. at 127-28.
135. Id. at 126 ("In fact, the Act creates no barriers whatsoever against
interstate independent dealers; it does not prohibit the flow of interstate goods,
place added costs upon them, or distinguish between in-state and out-of-state
companies in the retail market.").
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 128 (citing Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. R.R. Co. v.
Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851)). "[Tlhis
Court has only rarely held that the Commerce Clause itself pre-empts an entire
field from state regulation, and then only when a lack of national uniformity would
impede the flow of interstate goods." Id.

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 22:347

Missouri passed a law requiring
Feedlot, Inc. v. Nixon.139
meatpackers to disclose any price they offered to pay or actually
paid to sellers of livestock. 140 Nearly all packers who bought
livestock in Missouri came from out-of-state, and the feedlots
alleged that the price disclosure law would cause packers to avoid
doing business in Missouri, placing a burden on interstate
commerce.' 4 ' The State believed the law would benefit Missouri
farmers and the farming industry by improving the quality of
Missouri livestock and increasing prices. 142
The court found that the law only regulated the sale of
livestock within Missouri, which did not require out-of-state
commerce to be conducted on Missouri's terms. 143 It acknowledged
that the statute might affect the out-of-state packers' participation
in commerce in Missouri, but it did not dictate their behavior in
interstate commerce. 144
The statute did not chill interstate
commerce because packers were free to buy livestock in other
states. 145 The court concluded that the law applied equally to instate and out-of-state packers and producers and did not burden
4
the flow of goods in interstate commerce.' 6
iii. SDDS, Inc. v. State of South Dakota
The Hazeltine court relied heavily on its earlier decision in
SDDS, Inc.
SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota147 for its analysis.
involved a six-year battle waged in the courts, the legislature, and
administrative agencies over whether SDDS, Inc. would be able to
develop a large-scale municipal solid waste dump in South
Dakota.' 4s The battle culminated in a public referendum on
South Dakota voters rejected the
approval of the dump.
Legislature's approval, leading to the dormant Commerce Clause
challenge of the referendum. 149 The court determined that voters
defeated the measure because their purpose was to discriminate
against out-of-state waste and that the referendum had a

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

249 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 817.
Id. at 816-18.
Id. at 817.
Id. at 819 (citing Cotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1995)).
Hampton Feedlot, Inc., 249 F.3d at 819.
Id.
Id.
47 F.3d 263 (8th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 265.
Id. at 266.
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discriminatory effect against interstate commerce. 150
The court found that the initiative was "specifically designed
and intended to hinder the importation of out-of-state waste," not
Evidence of
necessarily to protect the environment.' 5'
"protectionist rhetoric" was found in the "con" statement (rejecting
52
the dump) that accompanied the referendum.'
The SDDS, Inc. court also looked to indirect evidence of
discriminatory purpose, noting that a referendum on a particular
dump is not the usual or most effective way of dealing with
environmental protection.' 53 South Dakota did not demonstrate
that the additional step of a referendum after review by
environmental agencies and the legislature furthered the
purported goal of environmental protection. 5 4 There was also no
information given to the voters about the environmental
consequences of the dump, only the admonitions against accepting
out-of-state waste. 155
The court also found that the referendum had a
discriminatory effect against interstate commerce. 156 Ninety-five
percent of the waste destined for the site was to originate outside
South Dakota. 157 It was determined that by denying disposal of
the trash, the costs were forced on other states, "when the market
58
would otherwise dispose of the trash in South Dakota."'
Imposing higher costs on other states is evidence of a
The court
discriminatory effect on interstate commerce. 159
60
scrutiny.
strict
survive
not
did
referendum
the
that
concluded
The public referendum vetoing administrative and legislative
approval of the SDDS dump violated the dormant Commerce
Clause because there was evidence of the voters' intent to keep

150. Id. at 272.
151. Id. at 268.
152. SDDS, Inc., 47 F.3d at 268. The "con" statement urged voters to vote
against the "out-of-state dump" because "South Dakota is not the nation's dumping
grounds,' and '[a] "NO" vote will . . . keep its imported garbage out of South
Dakota."' Id.
153. Id. at 268-69.
154. Id. at 269.
155. Id. at 269-70 ('Thus, because the voters were not provided with any
meaningful criteria, the defeat of the referred measure cannot be seen as improving
environmental protection.").
156. Id. at 270-71.
157. SDDS, Inc., 47 F.3d at 271.
158. Id.
159. See id. (citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S.
333 (1977)).
160. See id. at 271-72.
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out-of-state goods from entering South Dakota and no evidence
that the veto was motivated by environmental goals. Additionally,
the result of the referendum had a discriminatory effect on
161
interstate commerce.
b.

Pike Step Two: The Court Must Weigh the Legitimate
State PurposeAgainst the Burden on Interstate
Commerce

After evaluating whether the statute discriminates against
out-of-state parties, the court undertakes a fact-specific inquiry,
balancing the burden on interstate commerce against the state
purpose in enacting the law. 162 If the law has been found to be
discriminatory, the court will invoke a strict scrutiny test,
requiring the state to prove the law is necessary to achieve an
important state interest. 163 If the law has not been found to be
discriminatory, it is presumptively valid unless its burden on
commerce outweighs the local benefits. 164 Anti-corporate farming
law cases present courts with at least two legitimate state
interests to weigh: the state's power to regulate its local economy
and the state's power to regulate corporate activity within its
borders.
i.

Regulation of Local Economies is a Legitimate State
Purpose

"States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their
local economies under their police powers... "165 When Maryland
limited vertical integration in the local petroleum industry by
prohibiting producers and refiners from entering the retail
market, the Supreme Court concluded that the state has the power
to regulate the structure of the retail market. 166 The Eighth
Circuit has come to the same conclusion about local agricultural
market regulations: "[t]he Missouri legislature has the authority
In the
"..."167
to determine the course of its farming economy .
context of an equal protection challenge, it also found that the
policy "to retain and promote family farm operations in Nebraska.

161. Id. at 272.
162. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 96, at 410; see supra notes 108-111 and
accompanying text.
163. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 96, at 410.
164. Id.
165. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
166. See Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 129.
167. Hampton Feedlot, 249 F.3d at 820.
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. . by preventing the concentration of farmland in the hands of
non-family corporations . . . represents a legitimate state
68
interest."1
ii. Regulation of Corporations is a Legitimate State Interest
It is well-established that states have the power to "exclude a
foreign corporation, or to limit the nature of the business it may
169 Corporations are a creation of
conduct within the state ....
the state, which confers certain advantages and imposes certain
burdens long recognized by the Supreme Court:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature
of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of
its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental
best
to its very existence. These are such as are supposed
1 70
calculated to effect the object for which it was created.
For the purposes of a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the
state has a legitimate interest in regulating the operation of
corporations in its jurisdiction. 171
III. The Eighth Circuit Forced Strict Scrutiny Review on
Amendment E in Hazeltine
The Eighth Circuit in Hazeltine172 found that South Dakota's

168. MSM Farms, Inc., 927 F.2d at 333. The Missouri Supreme Court has
echoed the same principle: "[ilt is within the province of the legislature to enact a
statute which regulates the balance of competitive forces in the field of agricultural
production and commerce, thereby protecting the welfare of its citizens comprising
the traditional farming community .. " State ex rel. Webster, 744 S.W.2d at 806.
169. Asbury Hosp., 326 U.S. at 211.
170. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
171. See CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 89 ("We think the Court of Appeals failed to
appreciate the significance, for Commerce Clause analysis, of the fact that state
regulation of corporate governance is regulation of entities whose very existence
and attributes are a product of state law.").
172. Hazeltine II, 340 F.3d 583. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court in
South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 202 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (D.S.D. 2002)
[hereinafter Hazeltine 1]. The district court found a violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause only on the second step of the Pike balancing test on the very
narrow grounds that Amendment E inadvertently prohibits utility companies from
holding an easement on agricultural land, which burdens their ability to build new
transmission lines. Hazeltine 1, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 1050. The district court found
this to be a heavy burden on interstate commerce that is not outweighed by the
state's legitimate interest in preserving family farms and the environment. Id.
The court moved to the second tier of the test after finding no discrimination
against interstate commerce on the law's face, in its effect, or in its purpose. Id. at
1048. The court's opinion closely follows the statements of law and analysis set
forth in this Article. Because the Eighth Circuit found a discriminatory purpose,
the district court's conclusions about the burden on interstate commerce shouldered
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Amendment E violated the dormant Commerce Clause based
173
solely on a perceived discriminatory purpose by the State.
Multiple plaintiffs alleged potential injuries resulting from
Amendment E, including: prohibiting contracts to raise livestock
in the state; prohibiting existing corporations, exempted from
Amendment E,174 from purchasing more farmland; and prohibiting
or increasing the cost of easements that utility companies must
acquire for transmission lines. 175 Dakota Rural Action and South
Dakota Resources Council, two non-profit family farmer and
environmental advocacy groups, intervened as defendants, joining
76
the South Dakota Secretary of State and Attorney General.1
After an overview of dormant Commerce Clause law, the
177
court uses the discrimination test from Bacchus Imports to
arrive at its proposition that discriminatory purpose alone can
trigger strict scrutiny. 178 The court did not consider the state's
given purpose for the law-preserving family farms and the
environment. 179 The court then determined that Amendment E
was enacted with a discriminatory purpose and it does not pass
strict scrutiny.18 0
The court found direct evidence of discriminatory purpose
first in the "pro" statement compiled by the Secretary of State
before the referendum. 1 8 The statement warned that without
Amendment E, "[dlesperately needed profits will be skimmed out
of local economies into the pockets of distant corporations," and
"Amendment E gives South Dakota the opportunity to decide
whether control of our state's agriculture should remain in the
hands of family farmers and ranchers or fall into the grasp of a
few, large corporations."'18 2 The court found the "pro" statement to
83
be "brimming with protectionist rhetoric."'
Other direct evidence of discriminatory purpose was found in
Dakota Rural Action meeting minutes that discussed two out-ofby the utility companies was not discussed, and will not be discussed here.
173. See Hazeltine II, 340 F.3d 583, 596-597.
174. S.D. CONST. art. XVII, § 21(4). Amendment E contains a grandfather clause
allowing corporations that currently own land to continue to hold it. Id.
175. Hazeltine I, 340 F.3d at 588-89.
176. Id. at 589.
177. 468 U.S. at 270.
178. Id. at 593.
179. See id. at 593-94 (looking immediately to the required "pro-con" statement
circulated prior to the referendum).
180. Id. at 593-97.
181. Id. at 593-94.
182. HazeltineII, 340 F.3d at 594.
183. Id. (quoting SDDS, Inc., 47 F.3d at 268).
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state corporate proposals by Tyson and Murphy Farms to build
hog operations in the state, which the group opposed.18 4 The
Hazeltine II court pointed to these meetings that "led to
Amendment E" to show the drafters' intent to keep out-of-state
One meeting
corporations from entering South Dakota. 8 5
participant testified that Amendment E was motivated in part by
"'the Murphy hog farm unit [in North Carolina] and what its [sic]
done to the environment."' 8 6 The court found this reference to an
out-of-state corporation to be "blatant" evidence of discriminatory
87
purpose.
Hazeltine II also looked to "indirect evidence" of
discriminatory purpose, including "irregularities in the drafting
process" stemming from a "lack of information," and "a low
probability of effectiveness."' 8 8 The court concluded that "the
record leaves a strong impression that the drafters . . . had no
evidence that a ban on corporate farming would effectively
preserve family farms or protect the environment, and there is
scant evidence in the record to suggest that the drafters made an
effort to find such information."'1 9 The fact that the Executive
Director of South Dakota Resources Council believed that
"personal responsibility" was the best way to ensure compliance
with environmental laws, instead of being familiar "with all of
South Dakota's environmental regulations at the time Amendment
E was drafted," was evidence for the court that she was not as
"seriously concerned with long-term environmental hazards, as
[she] claimed she was .... 190
The court considered the drafters' heavy reliance on studies
correlating industrialized farming with higher levels of poverty as
"even less evidence that the drafters considered how Amendment
E would affect the economic viability of family farmers."'191 It felt
that if the drafters were really serious about protecting family
farmers, they would have commissioned their own studies to learn
the effects of a ban on corporate farming. 192 The court turned a
perceived lack of information into a judgment that Amendment E
has a low probability of achieving the state's purported goals of
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 594.
Id.
Id. (citing Trial Tr. at 659) (alteration in original).
Id.
HazeltineII, 340 F.3d at 594-96.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 594-95.
Id. at 595.
See id.
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protecting family farms and the environment. 193 It believed the
drafters irrationally viewed "out-of-state businesses ... as the sole
cause of the perils facing family farmers and a leading potential
cause of environmental damage."'194 Therefore, the court found
that the purpose of Amendment E was to keep out-of-state
businesses out of South Dakota, which "bespeaks of 'the economic
protectionism that the Commerce Clause prohibits."'' 195
In a footnote, Hazeltine II reaffirmed that the defendants did
not "bear the burden of disproving a discriminatory purpose," even
though the decision rested on a perceived lack of information as
much as a positive showing by the plaintiffs. 196 The court was
specifically troubled that the drafting committee did not compare
the potential impact of Amendment E on the environment with
197
enhanced enforcement of environmental regulations.
The court found a discriminatory purpose in enacting
Amendment E, and it therefore turned to the strict scrutiny test,
requiring the defendants to "demonstrate that they have no other
' 198
method by which to advance their legitimate local interests.
The court noted that preserving family farms and protecting the
environment are legitimate state interests. 199 However, after
acknowledging that it could not "say with certainty that any
alternative will ultimately succeed in meeting the goals of
Amendment E," and that the court is not trained to make such
determinations, it listed several other ways the state could achieve
these goals. 200 Basing its decision only on evidence that the
drafters of Amendment E harbored a discriminatory purpose
against specific corporations, the court struck down Amendment E
20 1
under the dormant Commerce Clause.

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
19).
201.

Id.
Hazeltine II, 340 F.3d at 595.
Id. at 596 (quoting W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 205 (1994)).
Id. at 595 n.6.
Id.
Id. at 596.
Id. at 597.
Hazeltine II, 340 F.3d at 597 (citing COMM'N ON SMALL FARMS, supra note
Id.
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IV. The Eighth Circuit Abandoned Federalism and
Precedent by Striking Down Amendment E in South
Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine
Rather than rewriting dormant Commerce Clause precedent
as the Eighth Circuit did, this Article will apply precedent to the
Hazeltine case. Because the conclusions of the second step of the
Pike test are almost perfunctory, the fate of the challenged law
rides on first finding discriminatory purpose and effect. 20 2 The
Eighth Circuit seemed determined to strike down South Dakota's
Amendment E, and it therefore forced a finding of discriminatory
purpose where none existed. The analysis will begin with a
discussion of the court's abandonment of federalism and
separation of powers doctrines, followed by an analysis of
Amendment E and the court's decision based on dormant
Commence Clause discriminatory purpose principals and
precedent.
A.

FederalismPrinciplesGuide Past Precedent that
Rejected Challenges to Similar State Laws

Federalism principles and past precedent demand that the
court credits the state's professed purpose for enacting the law if it
falls within the state's police power during the first step of the
Pike analysis. 203 The burden falls upon the plaintiff to show that
the state acted with a discriminatory purpose. 204 Even the
authority that the Hazeltine II court relies on most heavily, SDDS,
Inc., credited the state's interest in environmental protection then
evaluated the plaintiffs evidence of discriminatory purpose
against the state's purported purpose. 205 If the plaintiff cannot
bring forth evidence of discriminatory purpose, the court must
accept the state's legitimate interest and move to the second step
206
of the Pike test.
The court's evaluation of the indirect evidence of
discriminatory purpose impermissibly shifted the burden to the
state to prove that its purported purpose of protecting family
farmers and the environment would be achieved by Amendment
E.207 Instead of looking at the actual environmental harms caused

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
See supranote 196 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 151-155 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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by industrialized hog facilities, the court expected that the
executive director of an environmental non-profit be familiar "with
all of South Dakota's environmental regulations." 20 8 Even though
it anticipated and disavowed the criticism, the court essentially
placed the burden of proof on the defendants to prove nondiscriminatory intent because the plaintiffs were unable to
20 9
produce affirmative evidence of discriminatory intent.
The court went even further, surmising that if the drafters
were really concerned about family farmers, they would have
initiated their own studies of the effects of Amendment E. 2 10 In so
doing, the court again shifted the burden of proof to the
defendants. The defendants offered studies showing a correlation
between industrialized farming and higher levels of poverty, but
the court summarily rejected this evidence without even
articulating a reason why this study would not hold true in South
Dakota, and failed to recognize the connection between
industrialized farming and corporate concentration. 211
Furthermore, federalism principles require a state to be able
to make laws for the benefit of its citizens. 212 Every state law
pertaining to the health and welfare of its people is initiated by a
perceived problem-be it economic or environmental. The mere
fact a law responds to a specific situation involving out-of-state
corporations does not mean that it has a discriminatory purpose
under dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 213
The Hazeltine 11 court abandoned federalism principles and
contravened binding authority by failing to credit the state's
legitimate interest in regulating its local economy or the
operations of corporations within the state. 214 The court thus
forced a finding of discriminatory purpose in order to invalidate
Amendment E.

208. See Hazeltine II, 340 F.3d at 594.
209. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 191-192 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 191-192 and accompanying text. See also Hazeltine I, 202
F. Supp. at 1048 (citing MSM Farms, Inc. 927 F.2d 330) (accepting connection
between increased corporate control and declining family farms).
212. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
213. See infra notes 236-237 and accompanying text (stating that the dormant
Commerce Clause does not protect particular firms or methods of operation).
214. See supra notes 165-171 and accompanying text.
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B.

The Hazeltine II Court Violated Separation of Powers
Doctrine by Inquiring into the Substantive Effectiveness
of an Amendment Approved by State-wide Referendum

Relying on SDDS, Inc., Hazeltine 11 also found that a "low
probability of effectiveness can be indirect evidence of
discriminatory purpose." 215 In SDDS, Inc., the state could not
show that holding the referendum on the dump would advance the
state's environmental interests because an administrative agency
and the legislature had already determined that the dump would
The court inquired into the
be environmentally safe. 216
"probability of effectiveness" that the statute would procedurally
advance the state's goal of environmental protection. 2 17 Use of the
"low probability of effectiveness" evidence in SDDS, Inc. was not a
violation of the separation of powers doctrine but an investigation
of whether an additional procedural step requiring statutory
approval harbored a discriminatory purpose.
In contrast, in Hazeltine 11 second-guesses the judgment of
South Dakota voters on the substantive aspects of the amendment
by finding that restricting corporate ownership of farmland will
not advance the State's goals of preserving family farms and
protecting the environment. This is a violation of the separation of
powers doctrine. 218 Later in the court's analysis of the second step
of the Pike test, the court admits that it "cannot say with certainty
that any alternative will ultimately succeed in meeting the goals of
Amendment E because we are 'institutionally unsuited to gather
the facts upon which economic predictions can be made, and
professionally untrained to make them. '"'219 Yet, in the first-tier of
the Pike analysis the court felt competent to judge whether the
state's evidence constituted sufficient proof that the law would
meet its goal. 220 The court went even further by suggesting
additional evidence it would need to be convinced. 221 Analytically,
the court mixed the two prongs of the Pike test by using a
judgment of the law's effectiveness as proof that it could not have
been enacted for its stated purpose. 222 The court not only used

215. Hazeltine II, 340 F.3d at 595.
216. See supra notes 154-155 and accompanying text.
217. Hazeltine II, 340 F.3d at 595.
218. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
219. Hazeltine II, 340 F.3d at 597 (quoting General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519
U.S. 278, 308 (1997)).
220. Id. at 594-96.
221. See supranote 192 and accompanying text.
222. See Hazeltine II, 340 F.3d at 594-96.
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C. Dormant Commerce Clause Test: Discriminatory
PurposeAlone does not Trigger Strict Scrutiny
Although it seems to be universally accepted dicta that
discriminatory purpose alone triggers strict scrutiny, the very case
cited by the Hazeltine 11 court for that proposition found both
discriminatory purpose and effect. 223 The Supreme Court and the
Eighth Circuit have not applied strict scrutiny with only a finding
of discriminatory purpose. 224 This is a good indication that the
Hazeltine decision stands on shaky ground.
There is no facial discrimination in Amendment E; the court
does not even discuss the issue. 225 Furthermore, the court does not
even consider if the law has a discriminatory effect. 226 Logically, if
a law were drafted with the purpose of discriminating, it would
certainly have the practical effect of discriminating. This simple
truism is the basic analysis of the Court in Clover Leaf Creamery
Co.227 and Exxon, 228 and of the Eighth Circuit in Hampton and
229
SDDS, Inc.
The simple definition that discrimination is "economic
protectionism" 230 and "differential treatment of in-state and out-of231
state interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter
In order to ascertain
does not provide much guidance.
discriminatory purpose, the Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit
have laid down some rules to define "economic protectionism," by
defining what it is not rather than what it is.
1.

The State Must Apply "Differential Treatment" to Instate and Out-of-state Interests to Show Discriminatory
Purpose

Differential treatment does not occur if a state statute
223. Hazeltine II, 340 F.3d at 593 (citing Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 468 U.S. at 270).
See also supra note 117 (Bacchus found both discriminatory purpose and effect).
224. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
225. Hazeltine II, 340 F.3d at 593 ("[We rest our conclusion on the evidence in
the record of discriminatory purpose underlying Amendment E. As a result, we do
not consider the two other tests .....
226. Id.
227. 449 U.S. at 456.
228. 437 U.S. at 129.
229. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
230. Hazeltine II, 340 F.3d at 596.
231. Id. at 593.
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regulates in-state and out-of-state interests "evenhandedly" to
effectuate a legitimate state purpose. 232 If the law operates the
same on the affected in-state and out-of-state interests, it
"regulates evenhandedly." 233
Amendment E does not apply "differential treatment" to instaters and out-of-staters. 234 All non-family farm corporations,
whether they are in-state or out-of-state corporations, cannot own
farmland or engage in farming in South Dakota. Indeed, some of
the plaintiffs were South Dakota corporations or corporations
already operating in South Dakota that would be prohibited from
buying more farmland-proving that the law "regulates
235
evenhandedly."
2.

The Commerce Clause does not Protect Private Out-ofstate Interests

The interests protected by the Commerce Clause are clearly
The interests
economic, but they are very broadly defined.
protected are not those of particular firms. 236 The interests are not
associated with a particular structure or method of operation in
the market, such as a form of business organization like a
corporation. 237
The Commerce Clause exists to protect the
movement of goods within the market, and the dormant Commerce
238
Clause keeps states from burdening the movement of goods.
This point is particularly relevant to federalism and separation of
The states have traditionally maintained
power concerns.
regulatory power over the structure of local markets and the
operation of corporations in their jurisdiction. 239 Principles of
federalism dictate that the dormant Commerce Clause cannot
impinge upon these state powers. 240 The separation of powers
doctrine keeps the courts from second guessing the wisdom of the
state's regulation of local markets and corporations. 24 1 The
purpose of the Commerce Clause and the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine is not to protect particular economic interests such
as those of corporations. The state's power to regulate these
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

See supra notes 122, 129-130, 146 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 122, 129-130, 146 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 71, 267.
See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 131, 134 and accompanying text.
See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 96, 135 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 165-171 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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matters only implicates the dormant Commerce Clause when it
242
substantially burdens the movement of goods among the states.
The Hazeltine I court's preoccupation with the drafters'
intent to keep Tyson and Murphy hog confinement facilities out of
the state is misplaced. 243 The dormant Commerce Clause does not
protect particular firms, even if those firms happen to be from outof-state and control a large portion of the national market. South
Dakota has the power to regulate how the livestock market
operates within the state. Similar to Maryland in Exxon, South
Dakota may enact laws to discourage vertical integration of the
livestock market. 244 South Dakota also has the power to regulate
corporate operations within the state. 245 Tyson and Murphy may
still enter the state, but they may only operate according to the
dictates of the state. The dormant Commerce Clause was not
intended to be a sword wielded by particular corporations to strike
down laws that adversely affect their business interests.
3.

In-state Interests Must Receive Benefit from the Law as
a Prerequisite to Discriminatory Purpose

It is an elementary fact of politics that every local law is
intended to benefit local constituents (or elected officials would not
stay in office for very long). If any law with a local benefit will run
afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause, then nearly all laws will.
State sovereignty would be non-existent.
Federalism principles are one way courts protect a state's
ability to make laws that benefit local communities. 246 A court
must determine if a local law crosses over into economic
protectionism instead of invalidating any law with local economic
benefits. 247 Commentators have studied precedent and concluded
that "[riegulations seemingly focused on preserving local
employment as such rather than maintaining local profits have
sometimes received treatment almost as favorable as regulations
concerned with health or other non-financial aspects of well28
being." 4
Amendment E operates to preserve local employment rather

242. See supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
243. See Hazeltine II, 340 F.3d at 594 (discussing the "hog meetings" dealing
with the proposed Tyson and Murphy hog confinement facilities).
244. See supra notes 127-129 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 169-171 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 93.
248. TRIBE, supra note 98, at 437.
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than local profits. The drafters of Amendment E and the voters of
the state were operating out of the historical perspective of the
farm crisis. The people of South Dakota experienced the farm
They watched their local economies
crisis of the 1980s. 249
250
They also have heard what vertical integration and
struggle.
industrialization in the livestock industry has done in other rural
communities, and do not want it to happen to them. They have
experienced the migration in the agricultural sector toward
concentration and industrialization, and prefer their economy to
be based on smaller, locally owned farms. 251 To the voters of South
Dakota, this regulation is more concerned with employment than
profit. It is about maintaining a level of economic activity in their
local communities, so that the people of South Dakota may have a
place to live and work. They know the farms are the backbones of
their communities. Amendment E is not about consolidating their
hold on a market, or increasing their profits, but maintaining a
healthy economy. It is about holding on to what they have.
"State regulations seemingly aimed at furthering public
health or safety, or at restraining fraudulent or otherwise unfair
trade practices, are less likely to be perceived as 'undue burdens
on interstate commerce."' 252 Vertical integration of the livestock
industry may not be legally defined as an "unfair trade practice,"
but it has been criticized as having a monopolistic effect on a local
economy. 25 3 Amendment E probably will not lead to an increase in
profits for local farmers, but the downfall of Amendment E will
certainly lead to an increase in profits for the vertical integrators.
South Dakota is making a legitimate policy choice when it chooses
to regulate its local farm economy, rather than allowing a few
25 4
large firms to dominate its livestock market.
The benefits to the local economy from the state's regulation
in Exxon and Hampton did not seem to trouble the Supreme Court
or the Eighth Circuit respectively. 25 5 In Exxon, the state conferred
benefits on local independent petroleum dealers and consumers in
the historical context of the gas shortages of the 1970s. 25 6 In
Hampton, the law benefited the local farm economy by improving

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 51-59, 68 and accompanying text.
TRIBE, supra note 98, at 437.
See supra notes 42-44, 62 and accompanying text.
See supra note 49.
See supra notes 128-129, 142-143 and accompanying text.
Exxon Corp. v. Governorof Md., 437 U.S. 117, 117 (1978).
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the quality of Missouri livestock and increasing prices. 257 Based
on Exxon and Hampton, Amendment E has not crossed the line
into economic protectionism.
4.

Out-of-state Interests Must be Burdened as a
Prerequisite to Discriminatory Purpose

As with a benefit to a local economic interest, not just any
burden on out-of-staters amounts to economic protectionism. A
burden on a single out-of-state firm or class of out-of-state firms
The dormant
does not amount to economic protectionism. 258
Commerce Clause protects all out-of-staters as a class, not as
individuals. Hence, an intent to keep Tyson or Murphy from
setting up hog confinement facilities is not fatal to Amendment E,
just as an intent to keep Exxon out of the retail market in
25 9
Maryland did not amount to economic protectionism.
Out-of-staters are not burdened if only some out-of-staters
are excluded from a particular activity in the state. 260 In Exxon, as
long as out-of-state independent dealers could enter the Maryland
market and compete on the same basis as Maryland independent
dealers, the law did not burden out-of-state interests. 26 1 Under
Amendment E, an individual can move to South Dakota from
another state and buy farmland. A corporation can qualify as a
family farm corporation, incorporated in any state in the country,
262
as long as it meets Amendment E's criteria.
The Hazeltine 11 court read its own meaning into the "pro"
statement issued to the voters by the Secretary of State. 263 In
SDDS, Inc., the statement given to the voters showed
discriminatory purpose because it only referred to keeping out-ofstate garbage out without mentioning the state's purported
environmental goal. 264 In contrast, the "pro" statement found to be
"brimming with protectionist rhetoric" that supported Amendment
E directly addressed the state's intended goal of preserving family
It did mention "distant
farms and local economies. 265
corporations" and "a few, large corporations," but never explicitly
257. Hampton Feedlot, Inc., v. Nixon, 249 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2001). See also text
accompanying 142.
258. See supra notes 236-237 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 131, 134 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 131-134 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 131-134 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 71.
263. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 151-152, 155 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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stated an intent to keep out-of-state corporations from entering
the state. 266 The court read its own meaning into these phrases.
First, the only word that could conceivably imply that the
corporation is out-of-state is "distant." However, South Dakota is
a large state. A corporation on the western side of the state would
certainly be "distant" from a community in the east. 267

The

residence of the corporation is not the problem for family farms
and local economies, it is absentee ownership and monopolistic
effects of vertical integration and industrialized farming. 268 South
Dakotans could be equally concerned that corporations within
their own borders would drive family farms out of business. The
"pro" statement's reference to "distant" corporations does not
269
compel a finding of discriminatory intent.
Out-of-state interests are not burdened if the costs of doing
business in a state are the same for in- and out-of-staters. 270 The
state does not charge an extra fee or place any additional
requirements on out-of-state individuals or corporations starting a
271
farming operation in South Dakota.
Likewise, out-of-state interests are not burdened if the law
has no extraterritorial reach. 272 In Hampton, the meat packers
subjected to Missouri's law were only regulated if they chose to do
business in Missouri. 273 The prices set did not apply in any other
state. The same is true of Amendment E, as in Hampton: no outof-state commerce is required to be conducted on South Dakota's
terms. 274 The corporation is only regulated if it chooses to do
business in South Dakota.
Moreover, out-of-state interests are not burdened if goods can
still move freely from state-to-state, even if some may choose not

266. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
267. Hazeltine I, 202 F. Supp. at 1047 ("By the same token, a person engaged in
agriculture who lives in Aberdeen, for example, and wishes to manage farm land in
Lyman County also could personally not do business in a limited liability format.").
268. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
269. See infra notes 232-235 and accompanying text (stating that if a law applies
equally to in-state and out-of-state parties, there is no discrimination).
270. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
271. Hazeltine I, 202 F. Supp. 2d. at 1048 ('While the cost of doing business in
South Dakota may have risen for all concerned, namely both in-state and out-ofstate limited liability entities, and while that may suppress future development in
South Dakota, that does not translate into unconstitutional discrimination .....
272. Hampton Feedlot, Inc., v. Nixon, 249 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2001).
273. Id.
274. Hazeltine I, 202 F. Supp. 2d. at 1048 ("Amendment E does not affect how
these entities conduct business outside South Dakota.").
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to do business in the regulating state. 275 What was true in Exxon
should be true for Amendment E.276 Out-of-state interests may
still buy farmland and engage in farming activities if they follow
the regulation. Corporations are not entirely excluded from doing
business in South Dakota. They may enter for non-farming
purposes and for many farming purposes, including selling farm
inputs and buying farm products. 277 Agricultural products will
continue to move freely in and out of South Dakota, which is the
2 78
activity specifically protected by the dormant Commerce Clause.
Finally, out-of-state interests are not burdened if some outof-staters avoid doing business in the state due to the
regulation. 279 In Hampton, the court said that packers could
conduct their business in other states if they did not like the
regulation, which does not chill interstate commerce. 280 Likewise,
there is no chilling effect on interstate commerce because
corporations are free to bypass the South Dakota law by buying
farmland or building hog confinement facilities in other states.
5.

Amendment E was not Enacted for a Discriminatory
Purpose

A law will not be deemed protectionist if it regulates
evenhandedly, 28 ' falls on only particular firms or particular
business organizations properly regulated by the state, 28 2 provides
reasonable local economic benefits, 28 3 allows out-of-staters in the
market without imposing additional costs on them, 28 4 regulates
only within the state, 28 5 and allows the movement of goods into
and out of the state. 28 6 Amendment E meets all of the criteria.
Therefore, it is neither protectionist nor enacted for a
discriminatory purpose.

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

See supra notes 132, 145-146 and accompanying text.
See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
See text accompanying supra note 71.
See supra notes 134, 145-146 and accompanying text.
See text accompanying supra notes 145-146 and accompanying text.
Hampton Feedlot, Inc., v. Nixon, 249 F.3d 814,819 (8th Cir. 2001).
See text accompanying supra notes 232-235.
See text accompanying supra notes 236-245, 258-269.
See text accompanying supra notes 246-257.
See text accompanying supra notes 270-271.
See text accompanying supra notes 272-274.
See text accompanying supra notes 275-280.
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D. Second Tier of the Pike Test: If the Court does not Find
DiscriminatoryPurpose or Effect, It Must Balance the
Burdens and Benefits of the State Regulation Under
RationalBasis Scrutiny

If the court finds no evidence of discriminatory purpose based
on the criteria discussed above, the court must then find that the
state has a legitimate interest in the law to move on to the second
step of the Pike test.287 No proof of discrimination on the law's
2 88
face, or in effect or purpose, leads to rational basis scrutiny.
Under this standard, the court must ask whether there is a
legitimate state purpose for the law, and whether the law is
289
rationally related to its stated purpose.
Regulating the local farm economy and regulating the
operations of corporations in the state are both legitimate state
Discouraging absentee ownership of farms by
interests. 290
corporations and the accompanying industrialization of farming is
rationally related to Amendment E's prohibitions. 291 Amendment
E requires that a person holding shares in a family farm
292
corporation actually participates in the operation of the farm.
This requirement eliminates absentee ownership of farm
operations. The regulations also keep the corporations relatively
small, discouraging large, industrialized operations that are
293
problematic for the environment.
As with any economic regulation, there are incidental effects
on interstate commerce, but the benefits to the local economy
outweigh the effects. Some interstate firms will be limited in their
participation in South Dakota's agricultural economy, but the
dormant Commerce Clause tolerates such effects. Balancing the
local benefits against the burdens on interstate commerce,
Amendment E should pass the second tier of the Pike test. The
court does not reach this analysis, as it forced a finding of
discriminatory purpose in order to reach strict scrutiny, striking
down the law. 294

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

See text accompanying supra notes 203-206.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 96 at 410.
Id.
See supra notes 165-171 and accompanying text.
See supra notes, 24-25, 34-36, 43-44, 51-57, 62 and accompanying text.
S.D. CONST. art. XVII, § 22.
Id.
See text accompanying supra note 180.
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Conclusion: Consequences of the Eighth Circuit's
Abandonment of Family Farmers
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Hazeltine II sets a terrible
dormant Commerce Clause precedent for a variety of reasons and
should be overturned. First, the court departs from the deference
owed to state laws under the principles of federalism and
separation of powers, which seriously undermines a state's power
to legislate for the health, safety and welfare of its people. Second,
the court disregards and misconstrues established dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 295 Finally, if Hazeltine II stands,
this precedent will be used to strike down other progressive, profamily farm laws, not to mention other state laws that regulate
local economies and the operation of corporations within a state's
borders. 296 This final consequence is more than a matter of
principle; it will adversely affect the lives of thousands of real
people, farmers, and state citizens while lining the pockets of
corporate interests.
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